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ON HART'S WAYS: LAW AS REASON AND AS FACT
JOHN FiNNIS

I
I remember Hart saying to two or three of his colleagues, over tea and
biscuits in the Senior Common Room, that every ten years or so, going back
a long way, he read the whole of Proust's A la recherche du temps perdu. I
don't think he said why-Why should he have?-but central to what led him,
repeatedly, through all seven of these novels, on the long way from Du c6t
de chez Swann to Le Temps retrouvo, will surely have been their reflexive,
self-referential deployment and exploration of interiority, of the first person
singular. As Neil MacCormick justly says in the first edition of his H.L.A.
Hart,the "fulcrum" and "central methodological insight" of Hart's "analytical
jurisprudence" is that, as a "descriptive legal or social theorist," one can and
must "[hold] apart one's own commitments, critical morality, group
membership or non-membership," and "portray the rules for what they are in
the eyes of those whose rules they are."' One's account of law, as Hart
himself puts it in The Concept of Law, must "refer to the internal aspect of
rules seen from their [the members of the group's] internal point of view" and
"reproduce the way in which the rules function in the lives" of those members,
that is, in their "claims, demands, admissions, criticism... all the familiar
transactions of life according to rules," life as led by those for whom the rules
count as reasons for action, and violations of those rules count as a reason for
hostility.2

Somewhat less well known than Hart's prioritizing of the internal attitude
or attitudes to law are his works on self-reference (especially self-referring
laws3), and on intention (especially in relation to criminal liability, and to
human causation). But these aspects of interiority are as central to his thought.
In response to a remark of mine about, I think, how significant self-referential
consistency is to the testing of philosophical positions,4 he told me that what
started his interest in philosophy, as a boy, was the breakfast cereal packet.
1. Neil MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart (London: Edward Arnold, 1981), 37-8.
2. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 90 [88]
(hereafter cited as CL2, with bracketed numbers giving the pagination in the first edition, 1961).
3. On self-referring laws, see H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophy
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 15-16, 170-178.
4. See, latterly, Finnis, "Self-referential (or Performative) Inconsistency: Its Significance
for Truth" Proceedingsof the American CatholicPhilosophicalAssociation 78 (2004) 13-21.
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From the 1890s, I have subsequently discovered, 5 packets of Quaker oats have
depicted a substantial Quaker man holding a Quaker oats packet depicting a
substantial Quaker man holding a packet of Quaker oats... (and so on "to
infinity," claims someone talking about these packets in Aldous Huxley's 1928
novel Point CounterPoint). In relation to crime and punishment, causation,
and self-referring laws, Hart's attentiveness to our inner lives of thought,
judgment and decision was a motive for, and supplied arguments to advance,
his resistance to more or less behaviourist currents of (as he often put it)7
"scepticism" about central aspects and institutions of law, a resistance which
has been generally decisive for subsequent legal theory: a great legacy. In
summing up his vindication of responsibility against the sceptic Barbara
Wootton, he articulates what he calls "an important general principle":
Human society is a society of persons, and persons do not view themselves or
each other merely as so many bodies moving in ways which are sometimes
harmful and have to be prevented or altered. Instead persons interpret each
other's movements as manifestations of intention and choices, and these
subjective factors are often more important to their social relations than the
movements by which they are manifested or their effects.'
This talk of intention and choice complements and corresponds to what The
Concept of Law, published in the same year, says about the
whole dimension of the social life of those [who] ... look upon [the red traffic
light] [not merely as a sign that others will stop, but] as a signalforthem to stop,
and so a reason for stopping in conformity to rules which make stopping when
the light is red a standard of behaviour and an obligation.9
Here Hart italicizes signal for, and later on the same page he italicizes its
equivalent: "reason for." "Reason" is italicized more than any other noun in
the book;"0 it signifies practical reasons, the propositional element in thoughts
of the form appropriate to guiding deliberation and eventual (possible) action.
The first and fourth of the book's five italicizings of "reason" are to make the
argument that Hart was so eager, indeed impatient, to put forward even while
5. I knew what he meant, because an Australian cereal packet in the 1950s had the same
feature, but with frog not Quaker.
6. Point Counter Point (London: Chatto and Windus, 1928), 294.
7. See my review of his Punishment & Responsibilityin Oxford Review 8 (1968) 73-80;
the word "scepticism" appears in virtually every one of these essays.
8. H.L.A. Hart, Punishment & Responsibility:Essays in the Philosophy ofLaw (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1968), 182 (lecture delivered in 1961).
9. CL2, 89 [ 87-8].
10. See CL2, 11 [10], 55 [54], 90 [88], 105 [102], 194 [189].
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he was setting up the three "recurrent issues" about law-the argument that is
his answer to the "realist" scepticisms which reduce law to prediction.
Sceptical "realism" is poor as legal theory because it shuts one's eyes to the
fact that."the judge, in punishing, takes the rule as his guide and the breach of
the rule as his reason andjustification for punishing the offender";" a "judge's
statement that a rule is valid is an internal statement..., and constitutes not a
prophecy of but part of the reason for his decision."' 2 By the time of Essays
on Bentham, twenty years later, Hart had recast his theory of authority and law
so as to emphasize yet further the centrality to it of reasons for action
(peremptory and content-independent reasons).
... an authoritative legal reason... is a consideration (which in simple systems of
law may include the giving of a command) which is recognized at least in the
practice of the Courts, in what I term their rule or rules of recognition, as
constituting a reason for action and decision [, a reason] of a special kind.
Reasons of this kind.. .constitute legal guides to action and legal standards of
evaluation."
Now reasons of this kind, as articulated in commands or as manifested
verbally or non-verbally in the practice of the Courts, are historical facts. Like
other historical facts about thoughts, decisions and actions, they can, and often
must, be understood, thoroughly, without being endorsed or approved,
condemned or disapproved-just understood and faithfully described.
Adulterating one's understanding of other people's valuations (or of one's own
past evaluations) with one's own present valuations is sheer folly for the
general, the advocate, the detective, the assessor (judge of fact), the historian.
There should be no question here of "interpretative charity" or "making it the
best of its genre," let alone morally best.' 4 As Hart puts it in the posthumous
Postscript,"Description may still be description, even when what is described
is evaluation."' 5 True, to bother investigating and describing this evaluation
by this person or group, from among all the welter of other facts available for
investigation and description, presupposes an evaluation by the investigator,

11. CL2 , 11 [10].
12. CL2, 105 [102].
13. Essays on Bentham (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 18. Here Hart uses "evaluation"
much more broadly than "statements of value" in his contrast of the latter with "statements of
validity" at CL2 , 108 [104-5] (see text and note at n. 56 infra).
14. All this has been clear to me since I read R.G. Collingwood's 1939 Autobiography in
the early or mid 1950s. See William Twining, "R.G. Collingwood's Autobiography: One
Reader's Response," JournalofLaw and Society 25 (1998) 603-620, 603.
15. CL2 , 244.
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not to mention the audience.' 6 But that presupposed evaluation remains
external to the evaluative thought-the concept, action or practice--described.
So description can and, for many purposes, should be value-free even when it
describes the values and consequent actions of persons--of others or of
oneself giving an account of one's own beliefs and conduct.
But Hart went further, both in the Postscriptand earlier. As he puts it in the
Postscript:
...the descriptive legal theorist must understandwhat it is to adopt the internal
point of view and in that limited sense he must be able to put himself in the place
of an insider; but this is not to accept the law or share or endorse the insider's
internal point of view or in any other way to surrender his descriptive stance. 7
Here there has been a shift which Hart never seems to have attended to, and
perhaps would simply deny is a shift, from the description that is the stock in
trade of the detective, the assessor, the translator, or the historian to what Hart
calls "descriptive general theory."'" This shift is both real and important. I
am not going to dwell upon it in this paper; it is the burden of chapter I of
NaturalLaw andNaturalRights and of a number of recent writings of mine.'9
One's aspiration as a theorist about law and legal systems is to identify and
affirm general and warranted propositions about a human practice or
institution thoroughly shaped by thought. Developing a general theory
requires one to select among all the particular and very various vocabularies
and concepts that have been employed in social life both to shape and to
describe the various practices or institutions which, as a theorist, one judges
it accurate, illuminating and theoretically fruitful to call and treat as instances
of (say) law or legal system. This theoretic judgment is not settled by the
concepts or criteria articulated and/or used by those whose thought and
practice is being named and treated in this way-taking those one by one, or
taking the whole disorderly series of them. It is a judgment that requires one
as a theorist to select and adopt one's own concept and criteria, and to do so
16. "It is the historian'sjudgments of value that select from the infinite welter of things that
have happened the things that are worth thinking about." R.G. Collingwood, The Principlesof
HistoryandOther Writings in Philosophy offHistory, ed. W.H. Dray and W.J. Van der Dussen

(New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 217. Weber's version of this thought is better
known.
17. CL2, 242.
18. See CL2, 239-240.

19. See "Law and What I Truly Should Decide," American Journalof Jurisprudence48
(2003) 107-29, 115-125; "Natural Law Theories of Law," sec. 5in The StanfordEncyclopedia
of Philosophy (Spring 2007 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2007/entries/natural-law-theories/>.
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for reasons, as Hart does in working up his theory of law in The Concept of
Law.20 What he offers us in that book is a new and improved concept of law,
corresponding closely to the concept of law already employed in societies he
thought reasonably organized and reasonably and critically self-aware. But
even in relation to the concepts widely employed in such societies, Hart's
concept of law did "add value," that is, provided an improved understanding
of the cluster of features he identifies as the central idea and reality of law, and
of why those features can well cluster together-an understanding of the social
functions which that kind of clustering serves and promotes, in remedying
defects and affording facilities for advancing human purposes.
The extent to which Hart's descriptive explanation of law depends for its
explanatory power on presuppositions about good and bad in human affairs
was hidden from Hart in some measure by, it seems to me, some assumption
he made or thesis he held about concepts. In the notebook which seems to
record the genesis of key parts of The Concept of Law the word "Concept"
appears a number of times in large capitalized form.2' It was as if, in these
preparatory thoughts, the investigation or identification of a Concept somehow
lifted one's understanding, one's account, one's theory, above an investigation
of what particular people or groups (or any merely statistical-frequency-based
selection of them) have meant, or have intended, above their conceptions of
20. In his Introduction to Essays in Jurisprudenceand Philosophy, Hart accepts, as part of
his correction of what he had come to consider errors involved in his "early invocation in
jurisprudence of linguistic philosophy" (p. 5), that "the methods of linguistic philosophy, which
are neutral between moral and political principles and silent about different points of view
which might endow one feature rather than another of legal phenomena with significance" were,
precisely by reason of that neutrality and indifference to non-neutrality,
not suitable for resolving or clarifying those controversies which arise, as many of the
central problems of legal philosophy do, from the divergence between partly overlapping
concepts reflecting a divergence of basic points of view or values or background
theory .... For such cases what is needed is first, the identification of the latent conflicting
points of view which led to the choice or formation of divergent concepts, and secondly,
reasoned argument directed to understanding the merits of conflicting theories, [or]
divergent concepts or sets of rules... (p. 6)

Though it is not entirely clear how far this passage refers to concepts of law itself (the nature
of law), the passage fairly clearly accepts the reality of and need for selection of concepts for
use in a general theory of a subject-matter instantiated in varying forms because of the varying
concepts (ideas) of those persons and groups in whose life that (range of) subject-matter(s) is
instantiated.
2 1. For one instance ("the Concept of law") see the transcription of an important passage
from the 1950s notebook in Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 222. With that passage's account of how to
identify "a standardlegal system.. .without prejudiceddescription" compare the late- 1985 ms
note at ibid., 35 1, and the similar passage published in 1983 and quoted, supra, note 20.
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what it is important to promote as desirable (good) and avoid as undesirable
(bad), and above the theorist's own "pre-theoretical" judgments about
importance and desirability (good and bad), into a realm of timeless - truly
general-essencesor forms somehow available for adoption on inspection, a
neutral, value-free and "theoretical" perception. This, I believe, is nowhere
affirmed in The Concept of Law; if it is implied, as I think it is (and not only
by the notebook and the book's title), it can and should be regarded as a
philosophical myth, an illusion. In this respect, I think Hart's ideas about
method in legal theory regressed from the position he had affirmed in 1953:
that "the fundamental issues of legal philosophy" are those "discussed and
reflected upon" by intelligent students of (and surely because they are issues
raised and discussed in) Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Nicomachean
Ethics.22 Hart knew what he meant: he lectured in 1951 on Plato's ethical and
political theory, where, as in Aristotle too, whatever is said or implied about
the concepts, nature or essence of government, constitutionality, law and so
forth is controlled by the respective philosophical author's normative moral
and political theory. As Plato and Aristotle make clear, a theorist's judgments
that certain conceptions of political community, government, constitutionality
and law should have primacy in the theoretical description, and the strongly
evaluative (morally evaluative) grounds that Plato and Aristotle adduce for
those judgments, in no way block the theorist's descriptions of other
conceptions of polity, government, and law. In particular, those philosophers
of human affairs can, and did, provide careful and illuminating accounts of the
defective and inferior kinds and conceptions of polity, government and law
that are so frequently articulated or manifested, despite their normative
inferiority (sometimes gross immorality), in the life and history of the human
groups available for empirical study in their day.
II
Instead of pursuing further that well-trodden path, I want to turn in this
paper to another question arising out of Hart's interest in the internal point of
view and consequently in law's character as one kind or family of reason(s) for
action. The question is this: Even when his account in The Concept ofLaw is
enhanced by his adoption of something tantamount to Raz's concept of the
detached professional perspective, neither external nor internal, in the central
senses of those terms, how well do Hart's accounts enable us to understand
that kind ofpoint of view and that kind of reason for action? The issues I want
22. Hart, "Philosophy ofLaw and Jurisprudence in Britain (1945-1952),"AmericanJournal
of Comparative Law 2 (1953) 355-364, 357.
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to explore are not precisely those taken up by Neil MacCormick in the
appendix to his Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, where he disambiguates
what he calls cognitive and volitional elements run together in Hart's relatively
undifferentiated "internal attitude." But, while nervous lest there be a
Humeian implicature to his distinction between cognition and volition, I take
for granted, and accept, the many clarifications with which MacCormick there
and in chapter 3 of his H.L.A. Hart (1981) equips us for understanding what
Hart was trying to articulate in his over-simple distinction between "the
internal" and "the external" points of view.23
In January 1958, Stuart Hampshire and Hart published in Mind "Decision,
Intention and Certainty." Though Hampshire's name comes first, perhaps as
alphabetically prior, it is certain that Hart fully owned the paper's argument:
while in Harvard the previous academic year, he had not only worked on the
article24 but spoken at a philosophy seminar on "Knowing what you are
doing,"2 5 which is the article's theme and thesis. That thesis is: One has a
knowledge of, and certainty about, what one is doing, one's own voluntary
actions, which is not an observer's knowledge, and is not based like the
observer/spectator's on empirical evidence or on the observation of one's own
(the acting person's) movements: it is practicalknowledge. 6 First-person
statements about an action have the same meaning as third-person statements,
but as with "many concepts involving reference to states of consciousness"
there is an "asymmetry between first-person and third-person statements"
about actions, corresponding to the radical difference between the "means of
verification" of the respective statements, the kind of knowledge they
articulate.27 For the same reason, the article contends, there is a "necessary
connexion ' 28 between intending to do something and certainty about what one
will do-certainty based not on reflection upon and induction from the
evidence of one's experience (as might be the case with one's more or less
involuntary behaviour), but instead on one's having reasons 29for doing what
one has decided to do: "practical certainty about what to do.",

23. For my own, overlapping clarifications, drawing like MacCormick's on work by Raz,
see NaturalLaw and NaturalRights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 233-7.
24. Lacey, supra, note 21, 190.
25. Ibid., 187.
26. Stuart Hampshire and H.L.A. Hart, "Decision, Intention and Certainty," Mind67 (1958)
1-12,1, 5, 6, 8-9. The thesis can also be found prominently in G.E.M. Anscombe, Intention
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1957), but unlike Hampshire and Hart she proceeds to a robust examination
of practical reasoning and its upshot, intention.
27. Hampshire and Hart, supra, note 26, 10.
28. Ibid., 1.
29. Ibid., 4, 5, 12.
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Although neither "internal" nor any cognate appears in the article, it is
plainly a portrayal and exploration of what The Concept of Law will call the
internal attitude or point of view as it bears, not on rules or rule-guided action,
but on any sort of voluntary action. It explores other truths important to The
Concept ofLaw: the importance of distinguishing that first-person perspective
from the perspective or viewpoint or "attitude" 3 of any observer or spectator,
and the parallel difference between stating an intention-thereby evidencing
one's acceptance of reasons for action-and making a prediction that one will
act. The article is illuminating and sound, furthermore, in much that it stresses
about the empirical reality of practical knowledge and "free-will," and about
the connection between freedom of decision and having reasons for decision.3
But it has deep and pervasive mistakes, which shed much light on some
principal features of contemporary legal philosophy, features manifested in
and partly shaped by The Concept ofLaw.
At the very point where Hart and Hampshire bring us face to face with the
reality and distinctness of one's practical knowledge of what one intends to do,
or is doing, they mix up that practical knowledge with certainty; worse, the
certainty they speak of is predictive. Moreover: since will, which culminates
in choice (what they call decision), is really part and parcel of reason (for
willing is one's responsiveness to what one believes to be reasons), it is
unsurprising that, having conflated practical knowledge and predictive
certainty, they make X's choosing consist in (be "constituted" by) "becoming
certain"3 2 about "what he will do."33 Just when they are announcing that
reason can be practical as well as descriptive/predictive, they dissolve its
practicality into the descriptive/predictive.
One's decision, like one's
consequent intention (and thus of course one's disposition to act and one's
action), is unhinged from the reasons that precede, and in an unexplored sense
result in,34 the deciding/choosing.
Though it is true that, as the authors underline,3 5 someone who has not yet
decided between two or more courses of action must be uncertain about what
he will do, it is fallacious to conclude, as they do, that deciding is constituted
30. Ibid., 5.
31. See ibid., 4-5.
32. Ibid., 3.
33. Ibid., 2.
34. Ibid., 3: "The [agent's] certainty [about what he will do] comes at the moment of
decision, and indeed constitutes the decision, when the certainty is arrived at ...
as a result of
considering reasons, and not as a result of considering evidence. ... When he has made his
decision, that is, when, after considering reasons, all uncertainty about what he is going to do
has been removed from his mind, he will be said to intend to do whatever he has decided to
do...."
35. Ibid., 2.
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by becoming certain about what one will do. Indeed, it is not even true that
my deciding to do X entails, as they assert, that I am "certain that I will do this,
unless I am in some way prevented." For I know that I may change my mind,
reverse my decision, make a contrary choice. Hart and Hampshire, without
signalling their shift, later acknowledge this, saying that once I have made my
decision, which occurs when "all uncertainty about what [I am going to do]
has been removed from [my] mind, I will be said to intend to do whatever [I
have] decided to do, unless either [I fall] into uncertainty again, as a result of
further reasons suggesting themselves, or until [I] definitely [change my]
mind. 3 6 But neither the conditionality of conditional intentions3 7 nor the
standing significant possibility of change of mind (reversal of decision) is
elucidated or even discussed by Hart and Hampshire.3 8 The authors are left
both asserting and denying that to decide and intend is to make a prediction
(become certain) about what one will do.
The truth is that choosing, forming a definite intention, is settling not the
indicative-future question "What will I do?", but the gerundive-optative,
practicalquestion "What am I to do?", "What, in these or more or less specific
future circumstances, should I do?", "What is-to-be done [faciendum,
agendum]?" It is compatible with uncertainty about the merits of the option
chosen, and in that sense, compatible with uncertainty about what to do. For
choice between alternative options, in the focal sense of "choice" (electio,
selection and resolve) is really only necessary when (so far as the chooser can
see) the reasons in favour of one option are not all satisfied, or as well satisfied
in all dimensions of intelligible good, by the other option(s).3 9 Choosing is
also compatible with uncertainty about what one will do; for, especially when
the carrying out of one's intention is conditional on contingent future
circumstances, one can reasonably be alive to the possibility that one will
sometime before then find reason to reverse one's choice (perhaps even
36. Ibid., 3.
37. See Finnis, "On Conditional Intentions and Preparatory Intentions" in Moral Truth
and Moral Tradition:Essays in honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe, ed. Luke
Gormally, 163-76 (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 1994).
38. They pertinently put to themselves the objection that, because "deciding" and
"changing my mind" represent an act, something that I do, "deciding cannot be adequately
characterized as simply becoming certain about one's future voluntary action after considering
reasons, and not considering evidence." But their response restricts itself to asserting that it is
unclear what is meant here by "do," and never confronts the core objection.
39. See further Finnis, "Natural Law and Legal Reasoning," in Natural Law Theory:
Contemporary Essays, ed. Robert P. George, 134-157 (Oxford, 1992), 146-47;
"Commensuration and Public Reason," in Incommensurability, Comparabilityand Practical
Reasoning,ed. Ruth Chang, 215-33, 285-89 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997),
219-20.
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reasons that one had considered when making one's original decisiori). Hart
and Hampshire were right to point out the certainty one can and normally does
have about what one is doing, but wrong to extrapolate to certainty about the
future fulfilling of one's intentions; their error leads them to substantial selfcontradiction about the allegedly predictive character of statements of
intention, and to belated and unintegrated acknowledgement of changes of
heart/mind.
Nor do they adequately explicate one's certainty about what one is doing.
One knows what one is doing, I would say, because one's doing (in the case
of fully voluntary actions) is the carrying out of the proposal/plan that one
adopted in one's decision/choice. A plan is a rational structure, in thought, of
ends and means. As Aristotle and Aquinas have brilliantly illuminated, each
end except the one most ultimate (relative to some particular behaviour) is also
a means to some more ultimate end, and each means, except the exertion
involved in the very behaviour itself, also stands as an end relative to the
means next more proximate to that exertion.' Moreover, in the deliberation
that shapes alternative proposals for choice, ends and means figure
propositionally, as reasons for the respective courses of action envisaged in the
rival proposals. Each reason articulates a supposed benefit, a supposed
intelligible good, promised (not guaranteed!) by the proposed course of action
supported by that reason. Within each proposal that one shapes for oneself in
deliberation, every means (and thus virtually every end) is transparent for the
end which gives point to that means. So too, when one has chosen one
proposal in preference to the other(s), the reasons favouring that proposal and
course of action remain in play, giving one reason to exert oneself to carry out
the chosen action, whether now or when appropriate circumstances arise. The
propositional expression of this is not Hart-Hampshire's "I am certain that this
is what I will do," but Aquinas's imperium, "This is the thing for me to be
doing-what I should be doing" (not necessarily a moral "should")-the
directive (imperium, command), from oneself as rational self-determining
chooser to oneself as rational agent,4' to do what it takes to achieve the
40. On their understanding of means as nested ends, see e.g., Finnis, "Object and Intention
in Moral Judgments according to St. Thomas Aquinas," The Thomist 55 (1991) 1-27; slightly
revised version in Finalit4et Intentionnalitd:DoctrineThomiste et PerspectivesModernes, ed.
J. Follon and J, McEvoy, Biblioth6que Philosophique de Louvain No. 35, 127-48 (Paris: J. Vrin,
1992); Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, PoliticalandLegalTheory (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1998), 58-7 1, esp. 64 n. 20.
41. On the important and neglected reality of imperium in personal choice and action, see
NaturalLawandNaturalRights, 338-40. Hart, in conversation with me (again in the tea room),
once lightly mocked my account as replacing "push" theories of motivation (and obligation)
with a "pull" theory. But in understanding practical reason, and willing (which is in it, in
ratione), we must in the last analysis treat as misleading all metaphors borrowed from sub-
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intelligible benefits with an eye to which one chose (adopted the proposal one
did), benefits one believed and believes attainable by or in such conduct
(attainable if one's means prove to have the efficacy one envisaged for them
in one's plan/proposal).
Under pressure of Hobbesian, Humeian and Kantian misunderstandings of
practical reasoning, choice and (consequently) action, all this was much
neglected in the period when Hart was turning his philosophical attention to
the relation between reason and action, and correspondingly to the way in
which behavior becomes intelligible when understood as it is understood by
the acting person, that is, "from the internal point of view." But as the role of
reasons, though constantly pointed out, remains essentially unanalyzed and
incompletely integrated in the Hart-Hampshire treatment of intention and
practical knowledge, so their role, though again constantly signalled, remains
incompletely analyzed and integrated in The Concept ofLaw and even, I think,
in the later work explicitly focused on peremptory content-independent
reasons for action.
III
Consider Hart's canonical account or definition of the internal attitude. As
it bears on rules, it is the attitude of those who "accept and voluntarily cooperate in maintaining the rules, and so see their own and other persons'
behaviour in terms of the rules. 42 And, says Hart, "the acceptance of the
rules as common standards for the group may be split off from the relatively
passive matter of the ordinary individual acquiescing in the rules by obeying
them for his part alone."'
What should strike us, however, is the relatively passive character of even
the officials' internal attitude as characterized by Hart. True, they accept the
rules not simply as commonly accepted standards but as common standardsfor
themselves and others;" they use the rules to appraise their own and others'
rational motivation, let alone those from subhuman forms of motion. Reason's directiveness,
in practical as in theoretical reason, is sui generis, and so, accordingly, is willing, one's
responsiveness to reasons (intelligible goods).
42. CL2, 91 [88]; see also 90 [87-8], 98 [96], 102 [99]; 109-10 [106-7], 115 [112], 116
[113], 201 [197].
43. Ibid., 117 [114] (emphasis added).
44. MacCormick, H.L.A. Hart, 34-5, begins his explanation of the "stronger case" of
acceptance of a rule, "willing acceptance": "Not merely has one a preference for observance of
the 'pattern', but one prefers it as constituting a rule which one supposes to be sustainedby a
sharedorcommon preferenceamong those to whom it is deemed applicable" (emphasis added).
Later, p.41, he adjusts this to make the more important point: "the element of 'preference'
involved in the 'internal point of view' tends to be conditional: one's preference that a given
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conduct. But in Hart's account they at most cooperate in maintainingrules
that Hart's account treats as out there, available for acceptance and
maintenance. What is striking is the contrast between this and the classical
theory of law which treats as central and primary the positing of legal rules,
and-rightly, I believe-takes their epistemologically and ontologically
primary mode of existence to be their existing as a proposal adopted by the
choice/decision of their maker; adopted, that is to say, as a plan of conduct for
the community and its members and officials. Once made, promulgated, the
rules will of course have to be maintained. But this very maintaining is to be
understood as a kind of (re)novation of the making. That understanding is in
line with Aristotle's definition of the citizen as one who is entitled to share and
does share in governing the political community. Hart's notion of accepting
rules as common standards for oneself andothers is the nearest his core legal
theory gets to the classical notion of law's existence: as a kind of extending of
the law-making activities of the rulers, an extending by a kind of interior
personal re-enactment, person by person, of the ruler's or rulers' legally
decisive adoption of their own legislative or other law-positing proposals. 4
pattern of action be adhered to by all may be conditional upon the pattern's being and
continuing to be supported by common or convergent preferences among all or nearly all the
parties to the activity contemplated" (emphasis added). This justified adjustment is carried
forward on p. 43: "Where there is common acceptance of certain standards envisaged as being
shared or conventional standards, those who accept them belong to a 'group' but so 'from the
internal point of view' of these acceptersdo all those to whose conduct they deem the standards
applicable, and commonly that in turn depends on the possession by human beings of some
characteristic which is not necessarily a voluntarily acquired characteristic. Hence Hart's
crucial conception of a 'group' appears not to be prior to or definable independently of his
conception of a rule." This is illuminating, though the final "hence" is not altogether clear to
me, since members of a group of the kind in which the central case of law is instantiated are
characteristically able to identify their group (nation) even when a good many rules, including
at least some of the group's former rules of recognition, have broken down.
45. Finnis, Aquinas, 254-6: "Aquinas proposes and argues for a definition of law: an
ordinance of reason for the common good of a [complete] community, promulgated by the
person or body responsible for looking after that community. But in supplementing and
explicating that definition, Aquinas immediately stresses that law-a law- is 'simply a sort
of prescription {dictamen} of practical reason in the ruler governing a complete community',
and that 'prescriptions' are simply universal propositions of practical reason which prescribe
and direct to action. His explications also add that government (governing, governance) by law
means, equally concretely, that these practical propositions conceived in the minds of those
responsible for ruling must be assented to by the ruled, and adopted into their own minds as
reasons for action. The assent may have been induced only by fear of sanctions, though such
unwilling (reluctant) assent cannot be the central case of cooperation in government by law....
the present point is simply that law needs to be present in the minds not only of those who make
it but also of those to whom it is addressed-present if not actually, at least habitually-as the
traffic laws are in the minds of careful drivers who conform to them without actually thinking
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A law may, of course, as the classics constantly remind us, be a barely
articulate belch of malevolence against a minority (or indeed a perhaps
sheeplike majority), a decree mouthed by the terrorist ruler or rulers to a group
of henchmen officials and "people's" judges, and communicated by these
officials only fragmentarily and in deliberately confusing form to the subjects,
perhaps to induce some self-herding towards the slaughterhouse. But it would
advance no theoretical purpose to take such decrees and such forms of
governance as representative laws and legal governance when asking why it
makes sense to transit from Hart's "pre-legal" form of governance to what he
calls the central case of law and legal system, or when reflecting on what
would be lost in transiting from law to Marxian post-legal society, or when
considering the point and worth of the principles "which lawyers term
principles of legality,"'46 or joining the millennial debate about the respective
advantages of the rule of law and the rule of legally unfettered rulers.
But leave that aside. After all, everyone knows that there have been and
are-it's a matter of fact-rules laid down as laws, and described by makers
and subjects alike as law, which were and are deeply unreasonable, unjust,
immoral; it can happen that some of them do not even profess to be
reasonable, just or morally decent. That fact has nothing like the theoretical
significance Hart thought it did. As a matter of fact, there is no necessary
connexion between arguments and logic or validity as argumentation;
arguments worthless as argument-as reasons for a conclusion-can be found
all over the place. As a matter of reason, an invalid argument is no argument.
Again: As a matter of fact, there is no necessary connexion between
medicines and healing; countless medicines do not heal and many of them in
fact do nothing but damage health. As a matter of reason, such deleterious
medicines are not medicines and are not referred to in discussions of whether
there is good reason to devise medicaments and make them available. So too:
As a matter of fact, there is no necessary connexion between law and
reasonableness, justice or morality; irrational and unjust laws abound, as
natural law theory insists from earliest time until today. As a matter of
about them. The subjects of the law share (willingly or unwillingly) in at least the conclusions
of the rulers' practical thinking and in the plan which the rulers propose (reasonably and
truthfully or unreasonably and falsely) as a plan for promoting and/or protecting common good.
For just as an individual's choice is followed and put into effect by the directive {imperium}
of that individual's reason, so a legislature's or other ruler's choice of a plan for common good
is put into effect by way of citizens taking the law's directive {imperium; ordinatio} as if it
were putting into effect their own choice. The central case of government is the rule of a free
people, and the central case of law is coordination of willing subjects by law which, by its fully
public character (promulgation), its clarity, generality, stability, and practicability, treats them
as partners in public reason" (notes, citations and cross-references omitted).
46. CL2, 207 [202].
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practical reason, unreasonable (and therefore unjust and immoral) laws and
legal systems are not what we are seeking to understand when we inquire into
the reasons there are to make and maintain law and legal systems, and what
features are essential if law and legal systems ate to be acceptable-worthy of
acceptance-and entitled to the obedience or conformity of reasonable people.
(Of course, the study of arguments as reasons will include a study of fallacious
arguments, the study of pharmacology will include the study of bad medicines,
and a study of law, legality and the rule of law will include a subordinate study
of the ways in which bad laws and official abuse of legality and legal
institutions corrupt law, legality and the rule of law and need to be guarded
against by laws and legal institutions designed for the purpose.)
In that light, we can see that laws and law-makers systematically offer their
subjects at least four different kinds of reason for compliance. a7 (It goes
without saying that, as Hart constantly said, laws like every other social fact
provide the occasion for many other kinds of motivation for doing the same
thing as the law requires to be done: conformism and conventionalism,
careerism and cowardice, to name some of the motives, which Hart gave other
names.4") Where the posited law attaches definitions and either penalties or
other negative consequences to mala in se (say, rape), it invites its subjects to
treat abstaining from these forbidden kinds of act as something required by the
very same practical reason that the law-maker judged inherently sound and
sought to refine and reinforce, as well as by the next three kinds of reason.
Secondly, when we are in the zone of, broadly speaking, mala prohibita,the
posited law offers to promote common good (including, as common good
always does, what justice demands as proper respect for rights) by forbidding
or requiring some kind of act which is not already, as such, or always and
everywhere, excluded or required by well-judging practical reason. In this
zone the law offers its subjects the opportunity to accept and comply with it
both (a) for the same sufficient though often not rationally conclusive,
dominant or compelling reason(s) as the law-maker(s) decided to give effect
to in preference to the competing reasons for some competing alternative
legislative scheme, and (b) for the next two kinds of reason.
Thirdly, then, in the same zone of malaprohibitaor "purely positive" laws,
the rules in the second of these four categories are also held out to subjects
who consider the reasons in favour of the rule insufficient to warrant the law47. I discuss here only obligation-imposing norms/rules, and leave aside both (a) powerconferring norms/rules and (b) the question of the collateral moral obligation (not to be seen to
defy the positive law) that may subsist in some of the instances of laws so unjust that their legal
validity is deprived of the moral entailment that, presumptively and defeasibly, it would
otherwise have (NaturalLaw and NaturalRights, 361).
48. See CL2 , 231 [2261, 203 [198], 114 [111].
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maker's adoption of it; for such subjects there remains, nonetheless, a kind of
reason, often sufficient, to accept the rule as a common standard for
themselves and others in the same country, the reason afforded by the fact that
the rule is a valid part of the country's legal system.49
Fourthly, in respect of mala in se and malaprohibitaalike, the law usually
though not invariably offers its subjects, public or private, the kind of reason
afforded by the prospect (and undesirability) of undergoing punishment or
other penalties or authorized kinds of negative consequence. That kind of
reason differs markedly from the reasons which the law-maker has for
threatening and (usually different reasons) for imposing such penalties, and the
reasons that people amenable to the first three kinds of reason have for
complying with the rule to which the penalty is attached. For as Hart points
out in the clearest of his rather slender explorations of law's place in the flow
or network of practical reason(s),
'Sanctions' are ... required not as the normal motive for obedience, but as a
guaranteethat those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those
who would not. To obey, without this, would be to risk going to the wall. Given
this standing danger, what reason demands is voluntary co-operation in a
coercive system.5"
This passage, illuminating though it is, is not very clear, for it shifts to and fro,
without signalling, from viewpoint to viewpoint. Its first and third sentences
address the perspective of the law-maker, and of the subject (citizen or friendly
alien resident) who shares the law-makers' perspective; the first sentence also
alludes to the perspective of those (who may even be the "normal" majority)
for whom the normal motive for obedience is fear of sanction. The passage's
second sentence addresses the perspective of the subject as subject,
contemplating obedience or disobedience. The passage's conclusion, about
what "reason demands," presupposes, strikingly but ineluctably, that the
designer of the legal system, and anyone willing to adopt the designer's
viewpoint and purposes, envisages (has as an end or objective) a system with
a content (including forms and procedures) worthy of the voluntary
cooperation of a reasonablesubject. Hart here takes for granted that law, the
central case legal system that is the real subject-matter of The Concept of Law,
is an arrangement rationally prescribed, by those responsible for the
49. This is explored in some depth in Finnis, "The Authority of Law in the Predicament
of Contemporary Social Theory," Notre Dame Journalof Law, Ethics and Public Policy 1
(1984) 115-137 (the analysis is defended against Raz's critique, in Finnis, "Law as
Coordination," Ratio Juris 2 (1989) 97-104).
50. CL', 198 [193].
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community, for the common good of its members: ordinatio rationis ad
5"
bonum commune, ab eo qui curam communitatis habetpromulgata.
Notice that Hart does not specify what is bad in the "danger" that those who
voluntarily cooperate would "go to the wall"; the passage gets much of its
force from the plausible implication that it is, in some large part, the evil of
unfairness to them (for the disobedience of the scofflaws would, by
hypothesis, be going unpenalised). It is like the passage earlier in the book,5"
stating the "defect" for which the "remedy" is courts and "secondary" rules of
adjudication. For though Hart labels it inefficiency, what makes the absence
ofjudicial means of resolving disputes about rule-violation a defect is surely,
in some large measure if not predominantly, the unfairness to the party whose
wronging causes the dispute and/or who, being the weaker, would probably be
wronged if the dispute were ended by some non-judicial means. In each of
these cases, the fairness being appealed to just beneath the surface of Hart's
text is essentially the justice that he elucidates in his account of the justice of
compensation for injury: the injury upsets the "artificial equality" or
"equilibrium" established by moral (and, Hart should have added, legal) rules
which put the weak and simple on a (normative) level with the strong and
cunning; the upset is itself unfair/unjust, and it would be unfair/unjust to leave
it unrectified by compensation.53
To understand Hart's legacy, however, one needs to notice that he never
invites his readers to reflect on the relation-within the one book The Concept
of Law, let alone within his writings as a whole-between what he says there
about justice, what he says about reason, and what he says about the central
case of law and the "defects" it "remedies" and the "amenities" it provides.
This neglect of pertinent questions parallels other refusals to raise questions.
When judges around the English-speaking world needed the help of legal
theory to respond to the juridical challenge of coups d' tat and revolutions,
they could find nothing illuminating in Hart's theory of the rule(s) of
recognition. 4 For though that "ultimate" rule is explained by Hart as the
51. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1-2, q. 90 a. 4c; see Finnis, Aquinas, 255-6.
52. CL2, 93-4 [91].
53. CL2, 164-5 [160-161]. Hart should have recalled all this when considering the justice
of retribution as a general justifying aim of punishment, but seems never to have done so:
NaturalLaw and Natural Rights, 262-4; Aquinas, 210-15.
54. So they turned, albeit inappropriately and fruitlessly, to Kelsen, whose general theory
at least attempted to give a juridical account of the source of the validity of an existing
constitution, i.e. of the relation between a "momentary" legal system and the diachronic legal
system in which each momentary system takes its place. See Finnis, "Revolutions and
Continuity of Law," in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence:Second Series, ed. A.W.B. Simpson,
44-76 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971); J.M. Eekelaar, "Principles of Revolutionary
Legality," in ibid., 22-43.
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answer to a question, namely the question-which follows fittingly the
lawyer's sequence of inquiries seeking the reason for the validity of by-laws
and ministerial legislation-why a parliamentary enactment is valid, the
answer, namely that the courts and officials ( if not also private persons) have
the practiceof using the rule that what Parliament enacts is to be recognized
as law, is treated by Hart as "a stop in inquiries."55 What he has in mind is not
only, as he reasonably says, a stop in inquiries seeking further, more ultimate
posited rules, but also, as he disappointingly takes for granted, inquiries
seeking other juridically relevant reasons for continuing, discontinuing, or
modifying the practice in which the rule of recognition consists. When we
entertain, for reasonable affirmation or denial, the proposition that the rule
(and the system based on it) is "worthy of support," we have simply moved,
according to Hart, "from a statement of validity to a statement of value."56
In the idiom of the book, that is a way of saying we have moved outside
legal theory, outside the law, outside the juridical, and have nothing to offer
the judge who is asking, as judge, whether and when and how a successful
coup d 'tat alters the law of the land. Nor anything, indeed, to say to judges
who, in altogether ordinary times, ask themselves why they should continue
their practice of using the rule(s) of recognition and the criteria of legal
validity and juridical argumentation embodied therein or pointed to thereby.
For the book's legal theory, its account of law and the juridical, includes no
systematic engagement with "value"-only episodic forays into disintegrated
topics such as ajustice, and later a minimum natural law for "survival," which
have no articulated connection with each other or with the explication of what
makes law law.
In short: The Concept of Law, the Essays on Bentham, and Parts I-III and
V of Essays in JurisprudenceandPhilosophy display a legal theory or general
jurisprudence that, having identified its own descriptive dependence on the
55. CL2, 107 [104].
56. CL2, 108 [104-5]. After delivering this paper, I read N.E. Simmonds, Law as a Moral
Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), which at 126-36 develops a valuable
complementary critique of Hart's truncation of "the domain of the juridical" (126). There is
much illuminating argument and reflection in the book; it is mistaken, however, in saying (56
n. 28) that, in the theory of law developed in the central chapters of my Natural Law and
NaturalRights, the treating of the common good as central to the understanding of law is "a
consequence of' the methodological claims I advanced in chapter I about descriptive general
theory. Though chapter I of my book treats general legal theory which is descriptive in purpose
as a legitimate enterprise (provided it acknowledges its dependence on evaluations internal to
its method of concept-selection), the later chapters on law do not have a descriptive purpose,
but (for reasons underlined in my "Law and What I Truly Should Decide," supra, note 19) are
normative/evaluative in purpose as well as method, and are not at all dependent on the argument
of chapter I.
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internal point of view and attitude (in which rules are reasons for action),
leaves those reasons largely unexplored, and rests largely content with
reporting the fact that people have an attitude which is the internal aspect of
their,practice. Having so fruitfully gone beyond the observer's or spectator's
perspective on bodily movements and behaviour, it rests officially content with
a report that the participants have reasons for their behaviour and their
practice. It does not seek to understand those reasons as reasons all demand
to be understood-in the dimension of soundness or unsoundness, adequacy
or inadequacy, truth or error. To have been consistent in its abstinence from
engagement with that dimension-from "statements ofvalue"--Hart' s method
should have restricted him to the observation that people often think they have
reasons, that many people think or have thought that a pre-legal set of social
rules is defective, think that secondary rules are the remedy, and so forth. But
his book's engagement with its readers would then have been very different.
And, since by no means everyone everywhere has the same beliefs about
reasons, the question why select for report these supposed reasons rather than
others would have become deafening; it would have broken up the party.
IV
Before turning, finally, to the question why Hart so truncated his enquiry
into legal reasons, I should say a word about what Hart's successors, in their
reflections on the nature of law, have made of his legacy. (Perhaps the word
"legacy" in this conference's title was intended, not in the lawyer's sense of
what the testator chose to give, maybe with latent defects of which he was
unaware-the sense on which I've been relying-but in the loose sense of
what his successors made of it all.) Some have maintained (LP 1) that "in any
legal system, whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it
forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits
(where its merits, in the relevant sense, include the merits of its sources)."57
Others have maintained (LP2) that "determining what the law [in a given time
and place] is does not necessarily, or conceptually, depend on moral or other
evaluative considerations about what the law ought to be in the relevant
circumstances."" s The first thesis (LP 1) seems the more strenuous: "never by
reference to merits" is a stronger claim than "not necessarily by reference to
merits," and that helps explain why John Gardner, sponsor of (LP 1), ascribes
57. John Gardner, "Legal Positivism: 5/2 Myths," American Journalof Jurisprudence46
(2001) 199,201. This seems to be practically equivalent to Raz's "sources thesis", often called
by others "exclusive positivism."
58. Andrei Marmor, PositiveLaw and Objective Values (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001),
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to the thesis, and to its approach to law, "comprehensive normative
inertness."59 It corresponds to Hart's sharp distinction between "statements of
validity" and "statements of value." But in Hart that distinction seemed to
have the purpose, and more clearly had the effect, of restricting the theory of
law to accounting for social-fact-source-based validity without proposing any
statement of value.6 ° In Gardner, however, as in Leslie Green's similar
account of legal theory, and Joseph Raz's, in his own way61 too, the
affirmation of this sources thesis, (LP1), is said to be in no way "a whole
theory of law's nature." (LPl) is compatible, they affirm, "with any number
of further theses about law's nature, including the thesis that all valid law is by
its naturesubject to special moral objectives and imperatives of its own," 62 and
compatible with the thesis that "in some contexts 'legality' ... names a moral
value, such that laws may be more or less valid depending on ... their merits",
and with the thesis that "one must capture this moral value of legality.., in
order to tell the whole story of law's nature., 63 It thus becomes clear that
(LP 1) can and should be formulated more precisely, converting its universal
quantifier to an existential one: (LP') There is a "technically confined"' and
"intra-systemic" sense of "legal validity" such that validity in this sense can
be predicated of a supposed rule by reference only to social-fact sources,
59. Gardner, supra, note 57, 203; cf my comparison of his and Brian Leiter's uses of this
phrase in my "Law and What I Truly Should Decide," supra, note 19, 115-128.
60. The Postscript'sembrace (250-54) of soft or inclusive positivism does not significantly
qualify this restriction, since it is a social-fact source that, in such a view, licenses the jurist to
look beyond such sources to moral standards, and the legal theory of the kind that Hart
undertook is restricted, by the descriptive purpose so emphasized in the Postscript,to reporting
the social fact that the societies under study bring to bear, at this point in their legal reasoning,
the relevant moral beliefs they have and are licensed to refer to.
61. See his distinction between applying the law (restricted to social-fact sources) and
judicial argument according to law (which properly embraces moral reasons and reasoning
about maintaining, developing or amending the law): e.g. Raz, "the Autonomy of Legal
Reasoning," Ratio Juris 6 (1993) 1-15.
62. Gardner, supra, note 57, 210 (emphases added).
63. Ibid., 226. Green, in the final paragraph of his "Legal Positivism," The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
similarly affirms:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/legal-positivism/>,
"Evaluative argument is, of course, central to the philosophy of law more generally. No legal
philosopher can be only a legal positivist. A complete theory of law requires also an account
of what kinds of things could possibly count as merits of law (must law be efficient or elegant
as well as just?); of what role law should play in adjudication (should valid law always be
applied?); of what claim law has on our obedience (is there a duty to obey?); and also of the
pivotal questions of what laws we should have and whether we should have law at all. Legal
positivism does not aspire to answer these questions, though its claim that the existence and
content of law depends only on social facts does give them shape."
64. See text at note 7 infra.
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without reference to what ought to be the law (or the sources of law) according
to some standard not "based on" social-fact sources.
(LP') is entitled, it seems to me, to the assent of everyone everywhere.6 5
Certainly it is what was taken for granted by those who said lex injustanon est
lex, which, understood as its authors understood it,66 asserts that if a rule which
is legally valid in the (LP') sense is sufficiently unmeritorious it lacks the
entitlement to be counted as personally decisive for them by judges, officials
and citizens, an entitlement to directive decisiveness that is central to the
reasons we have for establishing and maintaining legal systems.
V
I return to the rule of recognition, which exists-and is the answer, ultimate
for Hart's legal theory, to the question "What is the reason for the validity of
the highest rule of change, if not of all the rules, of this legal system?"--by
being used as such in the practice of courts and other officials.
Like any other fact about what happens or is or has been done, practice,
whether idiosyncratic, widespread or universal, provides by itself no reason for
its own continuation. From such an Is no Ought (or other gerundive-optative)
can be inferred without the aid of another Ought or gerundive-optative Is-tobe-pursued-or-done. The fact that it is raining is in itself no reason to carry an
umbrella, no reason at all, even in conjunction with the fact that without an
65. See NaturalLawandNaturalRights, 290; "Natural Law: The Classical Tradition", in
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudenceand Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro, 1-60 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 8-15; "Law and What I Truly Should
Decide," supra, note 19, 128-9; and more precisely "Natural Law Theories of Law, " supra, note
19, at sec. 3.1,
66. Nothing could be stranger than Hart's decision to treat the saying as an invitation to
treat all positive law as morally binding: CL2, 210-11 [205-6]; for my critique, see NaturalLaw
andNaturalRights, 364-6; for Hart's reply, Essays in Jurisprudence& Philosophy,supra, note
3,11-12. Yet MacCormick is right to give prominence to the thought that motivates Hart in his
attempted critique of the tradition, the thought that we must "[hold] all laws as always open to
moral criticism since there is no conceptual ground for supposing that the law which is and the
law which ought to be coincide", with the result that "the ultimate basis for adhering to the
positivist thesis of the conceptual differentiation of law and morals is itselfa moral reason.. .to
make sure that it is always open to the theorist and the ordinary person to retain a critical moral
stance in face of the law which is": H.L.A. Hart,24-5; see likewise the opening paragraph of
MacCormick, "Legal Positivism: Hart's Last Word," paper presented like the present article at
"The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy," conference sponsored
by the Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy, Churchill College, University of
Cambridge, 27 July 2007. Since that moral concern was fully shared by the tradition assaulted
by so many theorists calling themselves legal positivists, much of the history of jurisprudence
over the past two hundred years or more is a tale of wasted zeal.
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umbrella I'll get wet. But facts like these can play their part in the reason, the
warranted conclusion (that I should [had better] carry an umbrella) which gets
its directive or normative element from some practical, evaluative premise
such as: it's bad for one's health to get wet, or: it's bad for one's ability to
think and function to get uncomfortably wet and cold. By virtue only of that
or some similar truth (as one supposes) about good and bad, the plain fact that
an umbrella can prevent these evils by keeping me dry can contribute to the
normative conclusion that I have reason to, or ought to, carry an umbrella.
Though David Hume himself thoroughly misunderstood and frequently
ignored or violated it,67 the inaptly named "Hume's Law" remains valid and
indispensable for an understanding of reason and normativity, ethical or
otherwise.
In his last writings, Hart identified accurately enough the way in which his
legal theory is enmeshed in something much more truly Humeian: Humeian
psychology, Humeian conceptions of practical reason, and Humeian
scepticism. His essay "Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons," the last
(no. 10) of the Essays on Bentham (1983), concludes that "judicial statements
of the subject's legal duties need have nothing directly to do with the subject's
reasons for action," a conclusion he rightly anticipates will seem paradoxical,
confused, and open to the objection that it "whittle[s] down the notion of [say,
the judge's] acceptance of the legislator's enactments as reasons for action"
to something very different from the essay's own explanation of what it is to
accept some directive as a content-independent peremptory reason for doing
what the directive directs-an objection which Hart virtually concedes,
professing a lack of "sufficient grasp of the complexities which I suspect
surround this issue."68 The objection can be reformulated: as against the thesis
of The Concept of Law, that at least officials (including presumably judges)
must accept the rules as common standards for their own and others' conduct,
this final essay holds that judges (and presumably other officials) need not do
more than speak (and think!) in "a technically confined way," that is "as
judges, from within an institution which they are committed as judges to
maintain," stating not what the subject has reason to do but only "what.. .may
legally be demanded or exacted from him., 69 But commitment, and
appointment and practice as a judge, are all just facts, which of themselves
afford no reason to act, no reason to stay committed or practice as a judge. So

67. See the detailed but evidently much ignored section 11.5 in NaturalLaw and Natural
Rights, 36-42, along with 33-36 and 47-8.
68. Essays on Bentham, 267 (emphasis added).
69. Ibid., 266 (emphasis added).
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the account strips away not only (as Hart admits) the subject's reasons for
compliance with law but also (as Hart does not signal) the judge's reasons.
Admittedly, this paradox or confusionpartly arises from something distinct
from the issues of reason and fact that concern me here, something only
methodologically significant: namely, Hart's disorderly neglect of central-case
analysis, his resort, pervasive in these late essays, to the question whether
judges, officials or anyone else need do or think or say such and such. To this
question the answer will usually and all too easily be "No, that way of acting,
thinking or speaking is not necessary." After all, countless kinds of less than
fully reasonable ways of acting, thinking and speaking can and sometimes or
even often do occur. But insistence that nothing save the logically or
ontologically necessary can be given any descriptive-explanatory priority
would devastate descriptive social theory, leaving it babbling about what is
possible and silent about the important, central and fully rational, and the main
ways of diverging from that.
However, undiscussed retreat from central case analysis is only one of the
causes of Hart's final position about the internal attitude on which he had built
his legal theory. That position can be reformulated as the claim that the central
case of law, as also of adjudication, involves no proposing, not even a
pretended proposing, of reasons for the subject's deliberation and action. But
that more focused formulation still leaves it indeed a paradoxical position, and
one that misdescribes what it is for judges to accept a rule in their practice of
adjudication. Of course, Hart formulated it as a thesis not about judicial
acceptance or attitudes, but about judicial speech. However, before judges can
speak, in a technically confined way or otherwise, to litigants, witnesses,
counsel and spectators, they must resolve, in deliberation, in the presence, so
to speak, of their own consciences, whether and how to speak. "They are
committed as judges", as Hart observes right here, to maintain the legal
institution within which they work, and in the last analysis their work is not
mere speech but interpersonal action which harms some and helps others in
very palpable ways. What are they to say to themselves, one may ask, about
their commitment?70 The plain fact that they made that commitment, publicly
70. It might seem as if Hart himself, on the previous page, had raised or identified this very
question, when he says (Essays on Bentham, 265) "...it would be extraordinary ifjudges could
give no answer to the question why in their operations as judges they are disposed to accept
enactments by the legislature as determining the standards of correct judicial behaviour and so
as reasons for applying and enforcing particular enactments" (emphasis added). But their
question, if it is pertinent, should and will rather be of the form---or at least should rather have
the meaning--"ShouldI be disposed to accept, apply and/or enforce particular enactments...?
Are there sufficient reasons for my doing so, and if so what are they?" [Simmonds, supra, note
56, 129-35, takes the decisive question to be, not what reason judges have for applying the law,
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and no doubt privately, by itself settles nothing, nothing at all, about what they
have sufficient reason to do, that is, about what is to be done, had better be
done, and in any relevant sense ought to be done by them. No Ought from a
mere Is.
At this point, just before his admission of the appearance of paradox (which
he cannot resolve), Hart suggests that his position would be quite different if
legal reasons for acting (often action contrary to one's interests and
inclinations) were "objective, in the sense that they exist independently of
[one's] subjective motivations."'', The implication of this and the whole
paragraph, that Hart did not believe in objective practical reasons, legal or
moral, was to be thoroughly confirmed by the last-written piece of work he
published, his hard-working review of Bernard Williams, Ethics andthe Limits
of Philosophy for the New York Review of Books in July 1986. The review
firmly endorses Williams's ethical subjectivism, while emphasizing its
controversial character. I quote just one passage in relation to which the points
I have been making about practices, commitments and the first-person
perspective may again seem pertinent:
...
the question, "What should I do in these circumstances" is essentially "firstpersonal" and not a mere derivative of and replaceable by "What should anyone
do in these circumstances?" For the "I"of practical deliberation that stands back
from my desires and reflects upon them is still the "I"that has those desires, and,
unless I am already committed to the motivations of an impartial morality,
reflective deliberation will not lead me to it. To hold otherwise is to confuse
reflection with detachment; and that confusion has encouraged the mistaken idea
but what justification they can offer others, notably the litigants before them, for applying it.
I agree that the latter question is of high importance, and very pertinent to the assessment of
Hart's position. But the judge's own first-person singular question is at least equally important
in itself and at least equally relevant to the theoretical debate. Simmonds is (134-5) as relaxed
as Hart about the fact that judges' reasons for adhering to the law "may be non-moral reasons
grounded in self-interest." Of course they "may" and doubtless often are. But self-interest can
never require more ofjudges than that they appearto be applying the law, and the opportunities
for plausibly and "deniably" corrupting the law's application are so great that here the firstperson question-the question that is conscience-is also of high public importance and
decisive for understanding the "archetype" or central case of law and legal system.]
71. Ibid., 266-7: "Of course, if it were the case, as a cognitive account of duty would hold
it to be, that the statement that the subject has a legal duty to act in a way contrary to his
interests and inclinations entails the statement that there exist reasons which are 'external' or
objective, in the sense that they exist independently of his subjective motivation, it would be
difficult to deny that legal duty is a form of moral duty. At least this would be so if it is
assumed that ordinary non-legal moral judgments of duty are also statements of such objective
reasons for action. For in that case, to hold that legal and moral duties were conceptually
independent would involve the extravagant hypothesis that there were two independent 'worlds'
or sets of objective reasons, one legal and the other moral."
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that if our moral beliefs are to be more than mere prejudices they must be
regulated by some general ethical theory au dessus de la m61ke of our ethical
practices."
The French phrase perhaps recalls the title of a once famous pacifist tract by
Romain Rolland, published in 1915 and alluded to directly in the last volume
of Proust's great book. Be that as it may, the passage shows again how
inadequately Hart's work represents the first-person perspective, in particular
the form that reasons take in that perspective (when I am concentrating on
reasons in the search for a right answer), and the way in which reasons can
lead me to change my mind and, if they are practical reasons, acquire new
motivations. The claim that "unless I am already committed to the motivations
of an impartial morality, reflective deliberation will not lead me to it" is simply
wrong. Could it be plausible to anyone who does not accept the Humeian
dogma that reasons cannot motivate?
As a general thesis about reason and will, that dogma is made to seem
tolerable, if not credible, by the assumption that the impossibility of rational
and rationally motivating ends leaves intact motivation by "instrumental
reasons," reasons which identify suitable and efficient means to sub-rationally
desired (and therefore "subjectively motivating") ends. But that assumption
is illusory. If I have no reason for my ends, I have no reason for adopting or
being interested in instrumental means to them, clever though the techniques
embodied in some of those means may be. As I put it recently, adopting an
argument of Christine Korsgaard:
..."unless something attaches normativity to our ends, there can be no
requirement to take the means to them." " Such ends, moreover, have to be
"good,in some sense that goes beyond the locally desirable."74 For "I must have
something to say to myself about why I am [willing an end, and am committed
and remain committed to it, even in the face of desires that would distract and
weaknesses that would dissuade me]-something better [to say to myself],

72. H.L.A. Hart, "Who Can Tell Right from Wrong?," New York Review of Books (17 July
1986) 49-52, 50 (emphasis added).
73. Christine Korsgaard, "The Normativity of Instrumental Reason," in Ethics and
PracticalReason,ed. Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997),
251.
74. Ibid., 250-251. Korsgaard, at 251, 252, is tempted to resile from this to allow for a
"heroic existentialist act" of "just tak[ing] one's will at a certain moment to be normative, and
commit[ting] oneself forever to the end selected at that moment", "for no other reason that that
[one] wills it so". But she should concede that unless such a person considers that there is
something worthwhile in doing so, some good in or reason for doing so, such an "act of
commitment" and of subsequent "taking [it] as normative" is not rational but irrational.
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moreover, than the fact that this is what I wanted yesterday""
(or indeed a
76
moment ago or even, in the struggle of feelings, fight now).
What am I to say to myself? That question comes to mind when reading the
final section of Hart's review of Williams. Having endorsed the author's main
arguments for denying that ethical/moral beliefs have rational foundations,
Hart asks "What bearing on practice will and should these arguments have?"
His answer begins by noting one of the fears that
have been excited by such skeptical thought... [the fear] that if it becomes
widespread we shall have nothing--or not enough-to say to the immoralist,
whether he is the coldly selfish egoist of private life, or the brutal advocate of
oppression in public life. But there is surely something laughable in the idea that
anything we could draw from philosophy could weigh with such characters bent
on having their way at others' expense. Why should it matter to them that there
is a philosopher's proof that, in acting as they do, they are irrational,
inconsistent, or flying in the face of some moral truths? As Williams says,
"What will the professor's justification do when they break down the door,
smash his spectacles, take him away?"77
But the interesting question is not: What have I to say to the barbarians to
persuade them that they should desist? It is: What have I to say to myself
when I ask myself whether I shouldn't perhaps be on the winning side and
team up with them?7"

75. Ibid., p. 250.
76. Finnis, "Foundations of Practical Reason Revisited," American Journal of
Jurisprudence50 (2005) 109-131, 113-4. For my criticism of Korsgaard's attempts to develop
a non-Humeian conception of practical reason, see ibid., 114-8.
77. Hart, supra, note 72, 52.
78. Hart's next paragraph speculates about the reactions not of the immoralist or the egoist
but of"more ordinary people who with various degrees of conviction, difficulty, and backsliding
manage to live up to the moral standards they have acquired and developed in their social life and
to transmit them to their children," and gradually he locates "us", the first-person plural, among
them: When they/we discover the truth of ethical scepticism, "the sense of necessity (the moral
'I must') in which the recognition of moral obligation often terminates, will have to be seen as
coming not from outside, but from what is most deeply inside us even though it is normally also
supported by others who share our practices and beliefs. The fear is that this will not be enough
and that when we come to think of our moral standards as resting on no further foundation, we
shall disregard them whenever they stand in the way of our getting or doing what we want."
Hart's response to this fear begins: "How likely this is, is a question of moral psychology about
which we know little enough...," and never gets round to considering what one should think
about the directive force of one's "moral standards" once one discovers, through philosophical
argumentation, that they merely "come from what is most deeply inside us" and reflect
motivations and "concerns" which one just happens to have but which plenty of other people do
not have, and which collide with other motivations and lively interests one has deep inside one.
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Williams and, more hesitantly, Hart attribute to certain ethical beliefs some
measure of immunity from their scepticism: what they call "substantive" or
"thick" ethical concepts, as used unreflectively and uncritically in "a simple
traditional society": concepts such as "cruelty, lying, brutality, treachery, and
gratitude," as distinct from "abstract all-purpose evaluative concepts of 'ought'
and 'right' and 'good'." But in this marshalling by Hart and Williams of
practical predicates for classification between thick and thin we find omitted
yet again, as in Hume and Kant and chapter IX. 1-2 of The Concept ofLaw, the
intelligible goods of knowledge, life and health, friendship, reasonableness in
one's inner life and one's outer actions, and the other fundamental reasons we
all have for choosing and doing anything worthwhile we do or should do.
These ends, taken in their fundamental intelligibility as good not only for me
but anyone, and all the more when taken in their reflective implications as the
elements of human flourishing and so79 the key to adequately understanding
our nature as persons, are so substantive, "thick," and so far from being merely
"abstract," that they are the "deep inside" of all that we can and should "say
to ourselves" to warrant our decisions as law-makers, law-appliers (executive
or judicial), and citizens. The pursuit of these basic goods needs and can be
given rational integration by the Golden Rule and other principles of that
reasonableness we call ethical/moral, and by the call of reason to be attentive
to architectonic facts such as the possibility of free choice, and the subsisting
of personal, familial and (in different ways) national identity (partly given and
partly constituted as the intransitive implications of free choices).,s Such
integration reinforces and makes more pointed the rational directiveness of the
initial normativity entailed by the intelligible desirability of the basic human
goods, that is, from their priority as reasons both for action and for abstention
from what by entailment from them are basic forms of harm by conduct or
neglect. These basic reasons for action are the rational ground for the Hartian
primary rules restricting violence, theft and fraud, and in their implications are
the ground also for the Hartian remedies called secondary rules.8
Was the moral scepticism to which Hart gives restrained but clear voice in
his last work a change of direction for him, something extrinsic to the
79. See Finnis, Aquinas, 29-34, 53, 90-92.
80. See Finnis, "'The Thing I am': Personal Identity in Aquinas and Shakespeare," Social
Philosophy& Policy22 (2005) 250-282; also in PersonalIdentity,ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred.
D. Miller & Jeffrey Paul, 250-82 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press,,
2005).
81. Hart's position in the Postscript,249, that it is "quite vain to seek any more specific
purpose which law as such serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of
criticism ofsuch conduct", is simply incompatible with the theory of law set out in The Concept
of Law: see NaturalLaw andNaturalRights, 6-7. It is part and parcel of the disorderly retreat
from central case analysis that we see in Essays on Bentham (see text after n. 69 above).
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architecture of his main work in the philosophy of law? I feel sure it was not. 2
In the notebook from which The Concept of Law emerges, immediately before
the key paragraph beginning "I have the dim...outline of this book in my
mind," are two sentences, on separate lines:
One side saying: you are blind
The other: you are seeing ghosts.
Midway between those years and the final years, his way of articulating the
issue, on the one occasion when our conversation touched explicitly on ethical
objectivity, was the same: It's a matter of "You're blind" versus "You're
seeing things." The ghosts he had in mind as The Concept of Law began to
take shape surely included 3 the "complex" and "debatable" conceptions of
"the human end or good," conceptions entertained by philosophers before
"other thinkers, Hobbes and Hume among them, ... [were] willing to lower
their sights."' And as we know, what Hobbes, not to mention his disciple
Bentham, found when the sights were right down and he looked inside was the
brute fact of desires, will as no more than the desire that last precedes action,
and, to make possible some unified theory, some desire by postulation
dominant, such as (in early Hobbes) the desire to surpass others for the sake
of surpassing them, or (in later Hobbes) to avoid death.
Trying to understand the internal point of view makes, I would say, no
sense as a method in social theory unless it is conceived as trying to
understand the intelligible goods, the reasons for action, that were, are and will
be available to any acting person, anyone capable of deliberation or of
spontaneously intelligent response to opportunities. Once these reasons are
understood, along with the accompanying, potentially reinforcing, potentially
disruptive, subrational inclinations (passions, emotions), theorists are equipped
82. His official position remained, to the end, that "legal theory should avoid commitment
to controversial philosophical theories ofthe general status ofmoral judgments and should leave
open, as I do in this book([ The Concept ofLaw] p. 168 [164]), the general question of whether
they have what Dworkin calls 'objective standing'." CL2, 253-54. But this was always an
implicitly partisan neutrality. For, as the review of Williams I think concedes, to withhold the
affirmation of such standing is to depart from the internal point of view of those who accept
moral standards as binding-depart in a way they would consider fundamental. Joseph Raz,
who knew Hart far better, I believe, than I did, speaks less cautiously about Hart's subjectivist
and (not unlike Williams) naturalist (I would say scientistic) view on these fundamental matters
and about their implications for his jurisprudence, in "Two Views of the Nature of the Theory
of Law: A Partial Comparison," in Hart'sPostscript:Essays on the Postscriptto the "Concept
of Law", ed. Jules Coleman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 4-6.
83. To be sure, the sentences in the notebook (which, though I have seen the notebook, I
quote from Lacey, supra, note 21, 222) doubtless also refer to the Realists' view (mistaken, as
Hart says) that obligation and associated reasons even for official (e.g. judicial) action are
illusory projections of feelings, psychological compulsions, etc.
84. CL2, 191 [187].
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to understand the myriad ways in which the practices of individuals and groups
can, do and doubtless will respond, reasonably and more or less unreasonably,
in the ever-variable but far from random circumstances of human existence.
Social theory may be fundamentally contemplative ("descriptive") in purpose,
or it may be fundamentally practical, intending to guide action-the theorist's
as muchas anyone else's-by identifying at least some outlines and principles
of right and wrong, better and worse. But descriptive social theory will be
unable to get beyond an endless video of local histories-or a merely statistical
ordering of them-unless it makes the judgments about reasonableness that are
fundamental to practical social theory. (Hart's theory makes and relies on
some.) And practical, morally oriented social theory will be a half-blind guide
unless it profits from the practical insights, and the transmissible experience
of inner and outer causes and effects, that are made available by history and
social theory, perhaps distilled and by imagination and intelligence enhanced
in great works of literary art.
The asymmetry between the first-person and the third-person viewpoint85
goes deeper than Hart and Hampshire identified. In the last analysis, it is this:
the third-person view terminates in facts, including facts about the beliefs and
attitudes, intentions and commitments of other persons; but in the first-person
view "I believe that p" is transparent for ,p.,,86 The "I believe" drops out,
leaving "p," usually not just one proposition but a network of propositions
some of which are reasons for believing others. One is looking not at oneself,
one's attitudes and beliefs, as facts about oneself, but at the proposition(s)
under consideration, the reasons there are for affirming it and the reason(s) it
gives for making it one's belief, one's attitude, and one's action, whether the
practical-theoretical action of judging it true or the practical-practical action
of following and putting into effect the intelligent and reasonable guidance it
gives, the good (benefits and goals) towards which it directs one. And because
the first-person (practical) viewpoint is concerned not, in the end, with facts
about oneself but with reasons (for action) that are both available to and bear
on the good of anyone like me (generically, all human beings), it is the domain
87
of common good and so the engine-room, the most proximate efficient cause,
of law.
In that perspective there is no reason to be found for stopping at the
supposedly "minimum" set of reasons which Hart appeals to, not simply in his
85. See text at n. 27 above.
86. On this transparency, see Finnis,FundamentalsofEthics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown
University Press, 1983), 70-74.
87. In respect of the law's positivity, it is also the formal (shaping) cause. Even wicked law
will almost invariably purport to be for common good, and should be juridically and morally
assessed by reference to the standing requirements of the common good that yield the principles
of legality or the Rule of Law, and the general principles of law common to civilized peoples.
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reflections on the "minimum content of natural law," but much more
importantly in his account of primary rules, private and public secondary rules,
and the union of them that constitutes law in its central instantiation and
concept(ion). I argued earlier in this long paper that that account gets its
persuasiveness partly from its suppressed appeal to reasons which, though
largely unarticulated or, where articulated, unintegrated in the legal theory
proposed in The Concept ofLaw, are reasons (good and not so good) pervasive
in Hart's other writings and indeed in his own life. His work is a standing
invitation to develop legal theory's critical account and promotion of those
considerations of justice, of concern for common good, which include the
general principles of legality and law common 8 to civilized 9 peoples and
make law salient9" as a means of governance and a reasonable exercise and
acceptance 9 of authority.

88. In NaturalLaw and NaturalRights, 286-9 1 articulated some of those principles, and
did so by reference to public international law. But their primary domain is, and will in justice
remain, the legal system of what Hart called countries, that is, the nation state, the political
community of persons who regard themselves as one people and organize their law and legal
system to be theirs as distinct from other peoples'.
89. Failure today to take seriously this qualifier makes freshly resonant the memoir
contributed by Lord Wilberforce to the privately printed record of the memorial meeting for
Hart in the University Examination Schools, Oxford, in 1993, recalling their friendship in the
1930s: "We shared... a sense of coming disaster which we knew would destroy our way of life.
... In 1938 we were together, with some lawyers and clerks, when the news came that Mr.
Chamberlain was returning with 'Peace for our time'. There was applause, there was talk of
going to the airport to cheer him home. We just looked at each other with tears in our eyes-it
was unnecessary to speak."
90. On this salience, see Finnis, "The Authority of Law," supra, note 49 and "Law as
Coordination," supra, note 49.
91. On the not merely "conceptual" reasons why authority entails obligation, and an earlier
reflection on Hart's stopping short in the identification of reasons, see Finnis, "On Positivism
and the Foundations of Legal Authority," Issues in Legal Philosophy:the Influence of H.L.A.
Hart,ed. Ruth Gavison, 62-75 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).

